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Abstract
Performing a dramatic act of religious devotion, creating an art exhibit, or releasing a new
product are all examples of public acts that signal quality and contribute to building a
reputation. Signalling theory predicts that these public displays can reliably reveal qual-
ity. However, data from ethnographic work in South India suggests that more prominent
individuals gain more from reputation-building religious acts than more marginalised indi-
viduals. To understand this phenomenon, we extend signalling theory to include variation
in people’s social prominence or social capital, first with an analytical model and then with
an agent-based model. We consider two ways in which social prominence/capital may alter
signalling: (1) it impacts observers’ priors, and (2) it alters the signallers’ payo↵s. These
two mechanisms can result in both a “reputational shield,” where low quality individuals
are able to “pass” as high quality thanks to their greater social prominence/capital, and
a “reputational poverty trap,” where high quality individuals are unable to improve their
standing due to a lack of social prominence/capital. These findings bridge the signalling
theory tradition prominent in behavioural ecology, anthropology, and economics with the
work on status hierarchies in sociology, and shed light on the complex ways in which
individuals make inferences about others.
Keywords: costly signalling, reputation, Matthew E↵ect, social capital, poverty trap
1 Introduction
Why do scientific publications published according to the same peer-review standard receive
di↵erent levels of attention depending on whether their authors have been highly cited in the
past (Hirsch, 2007)? Why can one winery sell a bottle of wine for $2000 while another winery
can only sell a comparable bottle for $2 (Benjamin and Podolny, 1999)? Why is the boost in
reputation that a villager enjoys after taking part in a ritual at a religious festival higher if the
villager is well connected than if the villager is more isolated in the village’s social network
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(Power, 2015)? These disparate examples share a common structure: individuals’ perceptions
of another’s quality depend on his or her social prominence; that is, how well-regarded he or
she is. (We use the term “social prominence” as an umbrella category to refer to what has
elsewhere been called status, prestige, or dominance).
Within sociology, there is a large body of literature, generally overlooked by evolutionary
scientists, that focuses on how status (the most commonly used term for “social prominence” in
this field) and quality can become disconnected. A common example of this is referred to as the
“Matthew E↵ect,” the idea that the “rich get richer,” as more prominent individuals receive
more recognition for their work than do less prominent individuals, regardless of underlying
quality (Merton, 1968). Evidence for the cumulative advantage of status has been found in
arenas as distinct as academia (e.g., Newman, 2009; Simcoe and Waguespack, 2010; Petersen
et al., 2011), the wine industry (Benjamin and Podolny, 1999), and music (Salganik et al.,
2006). Sociologists have documented many examples of inequality and “status dispersion”
that seem to indicate a gap between underlying quality or merit and the reputational rewards
people ultimately receive (e.g., Menger, 1999; Oakley and O’Brien, 2016). Experimental
work (Ridgeway and Erickson, 2000; Salganik et al., 2006; Muchnik et al., 2013; van de Rijt
et al., 2014; Correll et al., 2017; Hackel and Zaki, 2018) has shown how such patterns can
emerge particularly in situations where individuals draw on the beliefs of others. These
empirical findings, and some formal models (e.g., Podolny, 1993; Lynn et al., 2009; Manzo
and Baldassarri, 2015), suggest that the use of social prominence when attempting to evaluate
quality may lead to self-reinforcing dynamics that ultimately decouple the two.
Within evolutionary anthropology, there is a long-held recognition of the many benefits
of social prominence (e.g., Irons, 1979; Smith, 2004; von Rueden et al., 2011; Majolo et al.,
2012; von Rueden et al., 2014). There is also a growing attention to and evidence for the
intergenerational transfer of wealth of all forms, and how it confers sizeable advantages to those
born to parents with higher embodied, relational, and material wealth (Borgerho↵ Mulder
et al., 2009). In other species, such as Japanese macaques (Chapais, 1988) and spotted
hyaenas (Engh et al., 2000), there is evidence that dominance rank can sometimes be inherited,
leaving rank disconnected from strength. Similarly, within the behavioural ecological work on
dominance hierarchies there is increasing recognition of the critical role that social dynamics
have on ranks otherwise expected to follow from di↵erences in intrinsic attributes (Chase
et al., 2002). The intergenerational transfer of social prominence and the benefits that accrue
from it suggest again that there may be cumulative advantages to social prominence.
Despite this empirical evidence, many of the models used within the evolutionary sciences
posit a straightforward relationship between the social prominence of an individual and the
“quality” of that individual. Depending on the context, “quality” may mean attributes such
as fitness, strength, cooperativeness, knowledge, or skill. For example, models of cultural
transmission suggest that prestigious individuals receive deference because of the skills and
knowledge that they possess (Henrich and Gil-White, 2001; Henrich et al., 2015). Models
of indirect reciprocity use the direct history of individuals’ actions as a proxy for reputation
(e.g., Ohtsuki and Iwasa, 2006; Roberts et al., 2021; Santos et al., 2021), and suggest that
gossip about an individual can accurately convey that reputation (e.g., Sommerfeld et al.,
2008). Economic and evolutionary signalling models provide a framework within which qual-
ity may be accurately assessed through the relative costliness of signals. In the canonical
models (Spence, 1973; Grafen, 1990a;b), individuals’ assessments of others are tightly linked
to quality, although an accumulation of theory building on this early work has shown that the
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relationship between signal cost, signaller quality, and receivers’ perceptions is more complex
(e.g., Huttegger et al., 2014; Zollman et al., 2012; Wagner, 2013; Lachmann and Bergstrom,
1998). This theoretical literature, however, has generally not explicitly taken into account so-
cial prominence, which the empirical evidence suggests is also implicated in this more muddled
relationship between quality and reputation.
Here, then, we engage with a set of tightly linked concepts, all related to di↵erent aspects
of social evaluation and social connection (cf. Power and Ready, 2018). So far, we have
introduced social prominence, which generally has to do with relative standing, and is often
marked by acts of deference. To this, we now add the related concept of social capital,
which has to do with social connections and the resources they provide, marked not by acts of
deference, but by acts of interpersonal support (Bourdieu, 1986; Lin, 2001). Finally, reputation
refers to the beliefs that others have about an individual’s qualities, based on the assessment
of their (observed or reported) actions. Building on the evidence outlined above, we expect
that social prominence and social capital may both be drawn into the process of reputation
formation and assessment. Exploring the dynamic interplay between these may help to explain
the conditions under which we expect them to align or misalign.
To do so, we extend the canonical costly signalling model (Spence, 1973; Grafen, 1990a)
to include the signaller’s social prominence and social capital. This model predicts that
by engaging in costly signals, individuals can reveal their quality. We seek to analyse how
social prominence and social capital might a↵ect the reputational gains individuals get from
engaging in costly signals. We consider two mechanisms by which social prominence or social
capital can influence signalling: 1) they impact the observer’s evaluation of the signaller, or
2) they directly alter the payo↵s of signalling.
In the first case (“altered prior”), we are suggesting that social prominence or social
capital may be used as an indicator of quality by observers; if a signalling act provides
an opportunity for observers to note the attention, deference, or support received by an
individual, then observers may use this social information, alongside the costly signal itself,
to update their assessment of the signaller’s quality (i.e., the signaller’s reputation). The idea
that people often interpret social prominence or social capital as an indication of quality is well
accepted in sociology (e.g., Podolny, 1993; Burt, 2008; Manzo and Baldassarri, 2015), as well
as in evolutionary anthropology (e.g., Henrich and Gil-White, 2001), and social psychology
(Cialdini and Trost, 1998).1
In the second case (“altered payo↵”), we are suggesting that the attention or support that
a signaller has may enhance the visibility of a signal or otherwise facilitate its enactment,
meaning that the net benefit to more prominent signallers may be higher. Social capital
is fundamentally seen as having productive potential (Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1988), and
sociologists have outlined the possibility that network e↵ects may contribute to patterns of
cumulative advantage (DiMaggio and Garip, 2012; DiPrete and Eirich, 2006), so we should
have a strong expectation of this e↵ect2.
1One way to understand this is that social prominence/capital is being used as a cue of quality. We avoid
using the term “cue” here, however, because it has a very particular and narrow meaning in the behavioural
ecology literature (Maynard Smith and Harper, 1995).
2We note that although the behavioural ecological literature has considered di↵erential benefits, from early
costly signalling theory to explain begging by chicks (e.g., Godfray, 1991) to more recent models (Whitmeyer,
2021), they consider the opposite scenario to the one on which we focus here: that is, where the hungrier chicks
beg more and receive more food, unlike the “rich get richer” dynamic exemplified by the case study below.
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While we think that both social prominence or social capital could operate with either
mechanism, the altered prior mechanism may be more readily associated with social promi-
nence, and the altered payo↵ mechanism with social capital. We consider these two mecha-
nisms both separately and in combination, first in an analytical model and then in a dynamic
agent-based model in which signalling behaviour, social prominence/capital and social inter-
actions co-evolve. Our analytical model shows that if social prominence/capital is used as a
prior for quality, then individuals with higher prominence/capital have a greater reputational
gain after signalling than individuals with lower social prominence/capital. The agent-based
model shows that this mechanism leads to a “reputational shield” (low quality individuals able
to maintain good standing thanks to initially high social prominence/capital). The analytical
model also illustrates how allowing social prominence/capital to alter payo↵s introduces the
possibility that high quality individuals may not be able to signal due to their low social
prominence/capital, a possibility which does not exist in the classical costly signalling model.
The agent-based model model shows that this mechanism leads to a “reputational poverty
trap” (high quality individuals who are unable to improve their standing). The “reputational
shield” and “reputational poverty trap” can coexist if both mechanisms are present. By re-
examining the sociological models of cumulative advantage in light of signalling theory, we
seek to unite the signalling-based approach from behavioural ecology and economics with the

















Figure 1: Reputation (as measured by the proportion of possible reputational nominations
received) from before (the origin of each point) to after (the terminus of the line) the annual
festival, for villagers who perform acts of vow-fulfillment, as a function of social capital (here
measured by in-degree centrality in the social support network and normalised, to align with
Si). Orange denotes Dalit (Scheduled Caste) individuals, and green all others.
1.1 Case study: religious signalling in South India
Throughout this paper, we draw upon the example of religious signalling in a village in South
India (Power, 2017a;b). At the annual festival for the village goddess, Hindu residents fulfil
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vows made to the goddess in gratitude for her divine assistance. These vows can range from
breaking coconuts to sacrificing animals to walking across a bed of hot coals to piercing one’s
body with 101 spears. These acts are broadly seen as being revealing of the devotion (bhakti)
and character (kun. am) of the vow-takers, as they require not just physical endurance but
also mental resolve. Those with devotion and strong commitment are understood to bear the
burden of these acts more readily than others. While vow fulfilments are generally carried o↵
without a hitch, they can “fail,” as when a coconut fails to break when thrown or when a person
trips and falls while firewalking. These failures are often interpreted as divine punishment for
some fault, meaning that these acts are seen as risky, especially by those unsure of the depth
of their own devotion or worthiness. Vow-takers’ family and friends often accompany them as
they fulfil their vows, helping them to support the weight of the spears, giving them water, or
showing them respect by placing a garland on their shoulders. These acts are therefore also
opportunities for observing vow-takers’ social capital (as seen in the number of accompanying
supporters and the density of the pile of garlands around the devotee’s neck (Mines, 2005:
162-167)) and social prominence (as seen in the ordered distribution of honours (mariyātai)
that rank devotees by their status (Appadurai and Breckenridge, 1976)).
Drawing on signalling theory, such acts of vow fulfilment can be seen as credible demon-
strations of commitment to the religious community and its moral tenets (e.g., Sosis and
Alcorta, 2003; Henrich, 2009; Przepiorka and Diekmann, 2021). Such information may be
useful in determining who to form supportive relationships with. Consistent with this, resi-
dents who invest more in the religious life of the village are seen as more devout and more
prosocial (Power, 2017a), and are more likely to be named as providing others with support
(Power, 2017b). These individuals thus appear to benefit through both improved reputations
and supportive relationships with others. However, while these social benefits do exist, the
size of the benefit varies between individuals (Power, 2015; Xygalatas et al., 2021). Specif-
ically, among the vow-takers who perform particularly dramatic and demanding acts (such
as firewalking) during the annual festival, those who already have higher social capital and
greater preexisting reputational standing receive relatively larger reputational boosts than
those who are less well positioned (see Figure 1), indicating that there may exist increasing
reputational returns to social capital.
Throughout this paper, we draw on the example of this signalling system to motivate and
interpret the models developed here. We note, however, that we expect the phenomena we
are modelling to be quite general: costly signals modified by social prominence/capital have
the potential to be quite common in humans, and likely also happen in other group-living
species that draw on social information.
2 Analytical model: costly signalling game with social prominence/capital
Before introducing the role of social prominence/capital, we present the basic elements of the
model. We posit a game with N individuals who di↵er in some underlying quality q 2 {0, 1},
0 for low quality and 1 for high quality. Initially, everyone holds the same prior belief about
i’s quality, denoted ⇡1i with ⇡1i = 0.5.
During a public event, each individual simultaneously has the opportunity to engage in
a costly signal. Denoting ai an individual’s chosen action, we have ai 2 (r,¬r), where r is
the action to signal and ¬r the action not to signal. The cost of signalling depends on the
individual’s quality, where c1 is the cost for an individual of quality q = 1 and c0 is the cost
for an individual of quality q = 0, with c0 > c1. For each player i who decides to signal, a
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move of nature decides the outcome oi 2 {s,¬s} of their signal. Namely, the signal can
succeed (oi = s) or fail (oi = ¬s). The probability of success depends on quality, where ✓1 and
✓0 are the probabilities of success for q = 1 and q = 0 individuals respectively, with ✓1 > ✓0.
The signal and its outcome are public and are observed costlessly. Thus, all players observe
all the other players’ decision to signal. Having observed this, they make the same inference
q̂i|ai, oi about i’s quality, conditional on the decision to signal and the signal’s outcome.
Having separate term for success/failure is not a usual feature of signalling models, but
it is implicit in many signals, as when a vow-taker trips while firewalking, a big game hunter
returns empty-handed, or a gazelle staggers instead of stotting properly. Some models have
considered errors in signal fidelity (Lachmann and Bergstrom, 1998), where the signal received
is not exactly the same as the signal sent, but in this scenario the probability of success is not
linked to quality. Others have more explicitly considered success/failure (Huttegger et al.,
2015), but di↵er in that receivers are unable to distinguish between a failed signal and no
signal.
The solution concept for this static signalling game is the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. We
allow for mixed strategies and denote P (r|q = 1) and P (r|q = 0) the probabilities that high
and low quality individuals respectively engage in the costly signal. Applying Bayes’ formula,
the inferences q̂i made by all players j 6= i about i’s quality after the public event are:
Individual i signals and succeeds: q̂i|r, s =
✓1P (r|q = 1)⇡1i
✓1P (r|q = 1)⇡1i + ✓0P (r|q = 0)(1  ⇡1i)
(1)
Individual i signals and fails: q̂i|r,¬s =
(1  ✓1)P (r|q = 1)⇡1i
(1  ✓1)P (r|q = 1)⇡1i + (1  ✓0)P (r|q = 0)(1  ⇡1i)
(2)
Individual i does not signal: q̂i|¬r =
(1  P (r|q = 1))⇡1i
(1  P (r|q = 1))⇡1i + (1  P (r|q = 0))(1  ⇡1i)
(3)
The payo↵ function is given by ⇧(qi, q̂i, ai). This function satisfies the following properties:
(1) signalling is less costly for quality 1 than for quality 0 , which is expressed as ⇧(1, q̂i, r) 
⇧(1, q̂i,¬r) > ⇧(0, q̂i, r)   ⇧(0, q̂i,¬r), and (2) it is beneficial to be perceived to be of high
quality, which is expressed as d⇧(qi,q̂i,a)dq̂i > 0.
We have defined the basic elements of a static game of incomplete information, which we
now alter to introduce the role of social prominence/capital via two di↵erent mechanisms.
For each, we will then solve for the signalling probability for high and low quality individuals
(i.e., the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium strategy profiles), as a function of their social promi-
nence/capital.
Mechanism 1: altered prior
Our first intervention is to allow the prior ⇡1i to depend on Si, our term for either social
prominence or social capital. Si is benchmarked against the individuals with the highest and
lowest prominence/capital, so that it ranges from 0 to 1, with the highest value assigned to the
individual with the highest prominence/capital. An individual’s social prominence/capital is
revealed when they signal (regardless of the success or failure of that signal). Using this social
information, observers change their prior about the quality of that individual. In other words,
multiple streams of information are collected at the event: (1) observation of the signal, (2)
its success or failure, and (3) information about the social prominence/capital for those who
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hange in reputation after signalling
Figure 2: Altered prior mechanism. Red lines indicate the probability of signalling for each
type of player (high or low quality). Blue lines show the changes in reputation after signalling,
depending on whether the signal failed or succeeded. The parameters used are c1 = .2,c0 =
.4,✓1 = .8,✓0 = .6,⇧ = q̂i   ci and f(Si) = .1 + .8Si
chose to signal. Mathematically, this means that the prior is a function of Si, increasing as Si
increases (that is, ⇡1i = f(Si), with f 0 > 0). Importantly, Si is only observed if the individual
signals. Thus, it replaces ⇡1i in Equations 1 and 2 above.
The strategy profiles that form a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium therefore depend not only on
quality (which a↵ects the probability of success and the cost), but also on Si. Thus, in SI 1.2,
we solve for the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium strategy profiles (P ⇤(r|q = 1, S), P ⇤(r|q = 0, S))
with S 2 [0, 1], and demonstrate the di↵erent signalling regimes that can arise.
Figure 2 illustrates how the strategies vary with Si. As Si increases from its minimum
value of 0 to its maximum of 1, the strategies change according to the following sequence:
1. A hybrid equilibrium where the high quality individuals all signal and the low qual-
ity individuals signal with some probability that increases with their social promi-
nence/capital: P (r|q = 1, S) = 1 for all S; and 0 < P ⇤(r|q = 0, S) < 1 with
dP ⇤(r|q=0,S)
dS > 0.
2. A pooling equilibrium in which all signal: P ⇤(r|q = 0, S) = P ⇤(r|q = 1, S) = 1 for all S.
Figure 2 also shows the change in reputation that each type of individual gains after signalling.
We define this change in reputation as  q̂i = q̂i   q̂i,t 1, the di↵erence in reputation after the
public signalling event compared to before the event (reputation before the event is assumed
to be 0.5 for all individuals).
In the hybrid equilibrium, Si does not a↵ect change in reputation. Although Si directly
increases reputational gain, this e↵ect is o↵set by the fact that P ⇤(r|q = 0, Si) increases
with Si, which reduces the reputational gain. In the pooling equilibrium in which everyone
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signals, signalling itself is not informative. Only the success/failure of the signal and Si are
informative. As Si increases, it becomes more and more informative relative to the outcome,
so that at high Si, both successes and failures are thought to emanate from high quality
individuals with high probability.
We thus find that the gains from engaging in costly acts that are supposed to demon-
strate quality can be higher for those with higher social prominence/capital. As social promi-
nence/capital increases, it gains in importance in the public event because it becomes the main
carrier of information (since it leads to a pooling equilibrium in which the act of signalling
itself is no longer informative).
Mechanism 2: altered payo↵
Our second intervention is to make the payo↵ to the signal contingent not only on quality,
but also on social prominence/capital. Individuals with higher social prominence/capital may
incur lower costs from signalling, for example if they are bu↵ered by support from others, or
those with higher social prominence may accrue greater benefits, for example if information
about their signalling success is broadcast more widely. To reflect this, we now consider
a general payo↵ function ⇧(qi, q̂i, Si, ai) with the property that social prominence/capital




We find that at low values of Si we have a pooling equilibrium in which no one signals.
This is because the benefit of signalling is too low relative to the cost if Si is low, even for
high quality individuals (full details are presented in SI Section 1.3, with strategies plotted in
Figure SI.2b). As Si increases, we move to a fully separating equilibrium (P ⇤(r|q = 0, S) = 0,
P ⇤(r|q = 1, S) = 1). Then, as Si increases further still, we move to a hybrid equilibrium
in which high quality individuals always signal and low quality individuals signal with a
probability that increases with Si, until we reach the pooling equilibrium in which all signal
and observers can only distinguish q = 1 and q = 0 individuals because of the di↵erent
frequency of success and failure. Thus, under some threshold Si, observers cannot distinguish
high and low quality individuals (because no one signals). Above that threshold, the capacity
of observers to distinguish low and high quality individuals decreases with Si.
In SI Figure SI.2c, we also present the strategies that emerge with the combination of these
two mechanisms. It is similar to what we described for the altered payo↵ mechanism alone.
The di↵erence is that low quality individuals are more eager to signal, and so the probability
of them signalling increases faster with Si than when the altered payo↵ mechanism operates
alone. This causes the pooling equilibrium in which both types signal to prevail over a larger
range of Si values. This is because the altered prior mechanism increases the payo↵s from
signalling for high social prominence/capital, low quality individuals. In the agent-based
model below, this will a↵ect the reputational dynamics for these individuals relative to a
scenario in which only the altered payo↵ mechanism is at play.
3 Agent-based model: the co-evolution of reputation and social promi-
nence/capital
We now develop an agent-based model to explore the feedbacks between social prominence/capital
and the signalling behaviours analysed above. We lay out the key elements here, with the
details of the model and of the simulations in SI Section 2.
In this model, we combine multiple mechanisms by which individuals attempt to learn
each other’s quality. First, individuals engage in pairwise interactions. Individuals “visit”
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each other and in so doing make an inference about the probability that the person they visit
is of high quality (e.g., they notice that this person is more or less cooperative or helpful).
Their observation of other’s quality is noisy (see SI Section 2 for the exact way the inference
is made).
Second, there are public events. We consider a baseline public event in which individuals
observe each other’s current level of social prominence/capital (i.e., Si is revealed). Using Si
they infer quality q̂i = f(Si). This is the “cue only” mechanism in which individuals do not
have the opportunity to perform a public signal.3 This baseline represents the sociological
tradition (e.g., Gould, 2002; Lynn et al., 2009; Manzo and Baldassarri, 2015). We then move to
public events in which individuals have the opportunity to engage in a costly signal, following
the strategies derived in the analytical model. As above, their social prominence/capital
impacts either how the acts are interpreted (altered prior mechanism) or the payo↵s they
receive (altered payo↵ mechanism), or both simultaneously. We model di↵erent scenarios
that combine these mechanisms of learning (pairwise interactions, cue only mechanism, altered
prior mechanism, and altered payo↵ mechanism) in di↵erent ways.
Individuals are linked in a network defined by interaction weights (cf. Skyrms and Peman-
tle, 2000; Gould, 2002; Lynn et al., 2009; Manzo and Baldassarri, 2015). These interaction
weights determine who visits whom during the pairwise interactions, and also determine Si.
These weights are updated as the individuals learn about each other’s quality through the
mechanisms above. Formally, the weights evolve as wij,t =  wij,t 1+q̂i where wij,t is the weight
j gives to i at time t, and   is a discount parameter (for memory decay, or present bias). That
is, the weight wij accumulates information about i’s observations of j’s quality through the
pairwise interaction and the public events. In turn, the interaction weights influence who
engages in pairwise interactions, as well as each individual’s social prominence/capital (which
we model as a function of the sum of these weights). Hence, while Si was exogenous in the
analytical model, it is now fully endogenised.
We wish to understand the role of quality versus current social prominence/capital in shap-
ing reputation and building up social prominence/capital over time. To do so, we introduce
an initial bias in the interaction weights at the start of the simulation, which is unrelated to
quality (cf. Frey and van de Rijt, 2016; Hackel and Zaki, 2018). Hence, some individuals start
with a higher initial social prominence level Si. We then consider four types of individuals:
(1) individuals of high quality who start with higher Si, (2) individuals of high quality who
start with lower Si, (3) individuals of low quality who start with higher Si, and (4) individuals
of low quality who start with lower Si.
We present the results of four scenarios, all of which include learning through pairwise
interaction, but include di↵erent learning mechanisms in the public event. These four scenarios
are (1) cue only mechanism (a baseline), (2) altered prior mechanism, (3) altered payo↵
mechanism, and (4) altered prior and payo↵ combined. In SI Section ??, we consider more
scenarios, including a baseline with only private learning through pairwise interactions, and
a baseline with a pure signalling game that is not influenced by social prominence/capital.
Figure 3 shows individual trajectories, while Figure 4 shows the distribution of Si across all
rounds, for each type of individual.
In the Cue Only baselin model, the agent-based model produces dynamics that align with
3Here, it is reasonable to call this a “cue” both in the general sociological sense, and in the behavioural
ecological sense, as individuals do not have any control over the revelation of their Si.
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(c) Mechanism 2: Altered Payoff (d) Mechanisms 1 & 2
(a) Cue Only (b) Mechanism 1: Altered Prior

























type q=0, init S_i=high q=0, init S_i=low q=1, init S_i=high q=1, init S_i=low
Figure 3: Representative individual time series of Si (social prominence/capital), for individ-
uals of di↵erent quality and initial social prominence/capital. N = 300,   = 0.98, ✓1 = 0.8,
✓0 = 0.6, c1 = .2, c0 = .4, and f(Si) = .1 + .9Si. The payo↵ function is ⇧i = q̂i   ci, except
under the altered payo↵ mechanism when it is ⇧i = (S2i + 0.1)q̂i   ci
10
(c) Mechanism 2: Altered Payoff (d) Mechanisms 1 & 2
(a) Cue Only (b) Mechanism 1: Altered Prior















type q=0, init S_i=high q=0, init S_i=low q=1, init S_i=high q=1, init S_i=low
Figure 4: The distribution of Si (social prominence/capital) in each model, as a function of
the individual’s quality and initial social prominence/capital. The parameters are the same
as in Figure 3
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the sociological work on the decoupling of status and quality researched by Gould (2002),
Lynn et al. (2009), and Manzo and Baldassarri (2015). As expected, initial social promi-
nence/capital powerfully shapes reputation. Individuals with low quality but high initial
social prominence/capital are able to maintain a high level of social prominence/capital over
many rounds, while individuals with high quality but low initial social prominence/capital
struggle to build up their reputation (i.e., perceived quality) and social prominence/capital
(see Figure 3a). Gradually, the learning that occurs via the pairwise interactions leads to
declining social prominence/capital for low quality individuals and increasing social promi-
nence/capital for high quality individuals (see Figure 3a). Yet, this process takes many rounds.
As a result, quality and social prominence/capital are weakly coupled (see Figure 4a).
The SI provides a few more baselines. First, SI Section 2.2 shows that if we have only the
pairwise interactions, individuals learn about each other’s quality faster. Whereas if pairwise
interactions are uninformative, social prominence/capital perfectly reproduces itself and stays
fully decoupled from quality. Second, if individuals can signal but social prominence plays no
role in that signal (“pure signalling”) then types separate out quickly if the equilibrium of the
signalling game is separating or hybrid (see Figure SI.4). Pure signalling fully neutralises the
e↵ect of an initial social prominence/capital advantage even though social prominence/capital
shapes the pairwise interactions.
Having established these baselines, we consider the role of signalling under the altered
prior mechanism. The model runs show that thanks to costly signals, observers gain useful
information about quality (see Figure 3b). In particular, high quality individuals are revealed
over time as such, and enjoy increasing level of social prominence/capital, independent of
their starting point. In contrast, low quality individuals tend to lose reputation and social
prominence/capital over time, due to the fact that they sometimes do not signal, and expe-
rience failures more frequently. This feeds back on pairwise interactions, which become less
frequent (see Figure SI.5).
However, the model runs illustrate that the altered prior mechanism leads to incomplete
information revelation and unequal reputational gains. Low quality individuals with high
initial social prominence/capital can maintain a high level of both social prominence/capital
and reputation for many rounds, despite costly signalling events; we term this a “reputational
shield.”
To understand this shield, remember from the analytical model that when individuals have
high social prominence/capital, both types signal and information on quality is only gleaned
by the rate of success or failure of the signal. Signalling is thus mostly an opportunity
to reveal and advertise one’s high social prominence/capital. As a result, even though low
quality individuals fail more often than high quality individuals when they undertake the risky
costly signal, they are shielded by their high social prominence/capital: onlookers use social
prominence/capital as a prior, which favourably colours their interpretation of the signalling
act. These low quality individuals, however, do show a general decline in their reputation
over time, so this shield is temporary. It is more long-lived when pairwise interactions are
uninformative (or do not happen), and when memory is perfect (  = 1, Figure SI.7), which
allows misapprehensions to linger (see SI Section 2.3.1 and 2.3.2). We note also that the
fragility of the shield stems from the fact that signals can fail with di↵erential probability
(the probability of success is such that ✓1 > ✓0). The number of successes and failures, as well
as the pairwise interactions, create a gradual flow of information that slowly reveals quality.
If we instead set ✓1 = ✓0, such that success and failure is now random, we find that the
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reputational shield is much more robust and long-lived (see SI Section 2.3.3).
Next, we turn to signalling with the altered payo↵ mechanism, where the payo↵ of sig-
nalling is contingent not just on quality, but also on social prominence/capital. Here again
we find a slight “reputational shield,” but it is short-lived, at best, with low quality indi-
viduals eventually experiencing a rapid “fall from grace” and losing the initial advantage of
high social prominence/capital. This is because individuals are not shielded by their social
prominence/capital if their signal fails, as they are with the altered prior mechanism, and as
a result, signalling is less attractive for low types. They thus signal less often (hybrid equilib-
rium). Low quality individuals, then, are eventually identified as such and consequently lose
social prominence/capital.
More notable is what happens for high quality individuals. The agent-based model shows
that the consequence of the altered payo↵ mechanism is that it leads to a “reputational
poverty trap,” where high quality individuals who start with su ciently low social promi-
nence/standing do not engage in the public signalling event (see strategies in SI Figure SI.2b).
This is best seen by observing the trajectories for q = 1, initial Si = low in Figure 3c. De-
spite being reliably revealed as high quality in the pairwise interactions, they remain stuck in
an equilibrium of low social prominence/capital and low reputation because the costs of sig-
nalling are too high, greatly limiting their ability to build themselves up. This in turn limits
the number of pairwise interactions they engage in, which also prevents them from building
social prominence/capital. In contrast, high quality individuals who start with high social
prominence/capital reap yet greater benefits from their signalling acts: they are involved in a
larger proportion of the pairwise interactions, meaning that there is substantial inequality in
the number of interactions that individuals have (see SI Section ??, (cf. Anderson and Shirako,
2008; Frey and van de Rijt, 2016)). Of course, we also observe a similar pattern of relative
disadvantage for high quality individuals with low initial Si in the “cue only” condition, but
it is more absolute in this scenario.
Finally, when both the altered prior and payo↵ mechanisms are operating simultaneously
(following the strategies shown in SI Figure SI.2c) we see the continuation of the “reputational
poverty trap” and a more pronounced “reputational shield” (since with the addition of the
altered prior mechanism, we have added back the shielding e↵ect of Si in the interpretation of
the signals). This reputational shield does not last indefinitely: eventually, as evidence from
pairwise interactions and failed public signals accumulates, Si decreases to the point where
we reach the separating equilibrium. That equilibrium fully reveals quality, which is why we
see this rapid “fall from grace.” When memory is perfect (  = 1), as well as when pairwise
interactions are uninformative, the reputational shield is more protracted (see SI Figures SI.4
and SI.7).
In SI Section 2.3 we show the robustness of our results to di↵erent assumptions.
4 Discussion
Making inferences about others on the basis of their actions is complicated. Generally, we
should expect receivers of any signal to use the information they have at their disposal to
infer the attributes and intentions of signallers. This could include the signallers past actions
or, as we have explored here, their social prominence or social capital. In our models, the
production of a costly signal reveals public “social information” (i.e., information gleaned
from observing others). Widely used in group-living species (McGregor and Peake, 2000;
Valone and Templeton, 2002; Danchin et al., 2004), social information can provide additional
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information that may be costly or time-consuming to acquire directly. On average, social
information should be beneficial, as it can reduce uncertainty and increase the accuracy of
individuals’ assessments. However, our models highlight a point largely overlooked in the
behavioural ecology literature (cf. Giraldeau et al., 2002), although noted by the sociological
literature on status: the potential for some assessments to be less accurate, not more.
Most notably, our models show how drawing on this additional information may gen-
erally be informative, but can also result in systematic bias. In particular, we show that
if social prominence colours observers’ interpretation of a costly signal (by altering the ob-
server’s prior about the individual’s quality), then low quality individuals with high social
prominence/capital enjoy a “reputational shield” in which they “pass” as high quality for a
prolonged period. Second, we show that if social prominence/capital alters the payo↵s from
signalling, then we can obtain a “reputational poverty trap,” where high quality individuals
are unable to reap the reputational benefits of their acts if they start with low social promi-
nence/capital. Echoing other work demonstrating that signal costs may not be su cient
guarantors of signal honesty (Lachmann et al., 2001; Számadó, 2011; Fraser, 2012; Higham,
2014), we find, then, that reputation can lie.
Here, we have aimed to bridge the signalling models developed by economists and evo-
lutionary scientists on the one hand and the status models developed by sociologists on the
other. Sociologists’ models of status formation importantly demonstrate the possibility of
the decoupling of quality and status, as we too see in our “cue only” model. Yet, they do
not give individuals the agency to undertake costly acts to reveal their underlying quality.
By situating our work within the signalling theory framework, we allow for more agency on
the part of individuals, with a stronger pull towards truthful revelation and interpretation
because of the strategic incentives to maximise payo↵s. Hence, a mechanism that shows such
reputational misapprehensions within the signalling theory framework is likely to be robust
to selection, learning, and strategic reasoning.
One way to understand the public act we model is as the simultaneous production of
a costly signal (of quality) and an “index” (of social prominence/capital) (cf. Vehrencamp,
2000). The latter provides intrinsically reliable information, as when the roar of a red deer
unfakeably indicates its body size (Maynard Smith and Harper, 1995; 2003). The public act
in our models is thus a “multicomponent” or “multimodal” signal (Johnstone, 1995; Rowe,
1999; Partan and Marler, 1999; Higham and Hebets, 2013), which should generally improve
reliability and transmissibility. But here again we show that in some cases it can lead to
misapprehensions. Johnstone (1995) notes this possibility, but dismisses it, as the aggregate
assessment will still be improved. While this may be the case, we argue that more attention
should be paid to the cases where inaccurate assessments occur, and to their e↵ects: the
structural inequalities they can foster may not be inconsequential.
The second mechanism we explore, where social prominence/capital directly a↵ects the
payo↵s of the signal, demonstrates these potential consequences. Our finding that dispari-
ties in initial endowments (here, of social prominence/capital) relegate some individuals to
sustained and largely inescapable reputational deficit is the essence of a poverty trap, shown
by economists to a✏ict both individuals and whole economies (Bowles et al., 2006; Ghatak,
2015). Note that this simple alteration of the payo↵ function not only results in this trap, but
more generally increases inequality: we see a much more skewed distribution of social promi-
nence/capital, reputation, and pairwise interactions. While signalling here may generally be
reliable, the benefits of signalling fall very unevenly.
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In the South Indian case, villagers di↵er substantially in their social capital and social
prominence, and some of that variation is driven by factors beyond their control. In this
context, the most obvious factors to consider are those of gender and caste, where women
(Power and Ready, 2018) and Dalits (Figure 1) often have lower social prominence or social
capital. Such starting disadvantages may be su cient to jump-start the feedbacks that we
explore here, reinforcing gender-, caste-, or class-based inequality (cf. O’Connor, 2019). While
the details will di↵er in other social contexts, when certain groups su↵er an initial social
disadvantage, this can be amplified by signals that reveal social prominence/capital even
though individuals have the agency to pro-actively “prove their worth” through costly signals.
So, for example, beyond general evidence of cumulative advantage in academic citations, we
also see systematic biases in citation on the basis of gender or race and ethnicity (e.g., Dworkin
et al., 2020; Bertolero et al., 2020).
5 Conclusion: future directions
We have explored how signalling theory can be extended to include an individual’s social
prominence/capital in the decision to signal and in receivers assessments. Our focus has been
less on the stable set of strategies that may be employed, and more on their consequences
(cf. Frey and van de Rijt, 2016; Hackel and Zaki, 2018; Tsvetkova, 2021). We hope that
this emphasis on the structural outcomes of individuals’ strategic decisions will prompt more
exploration in the evolutionary sciences.
Changing how (and how many) interactions take place could add new complexity to the
dynamics studied here. As our model does not limit the number of pairwise interactions
individuals can have, or allow individuals to refuse or select specific partners, those of higher
social prominence/capital have more interactions. This means these individuals are more
thoroughly assessed, while those of lower prominence/capital have fewer chances to correct
any misapprehensions (but see SI Section 2.3.1). If all individuals had a larger number of
interactions, the quality of all individuals might be more readily revealed; we do not currently
explore how these balance. The interactions in our model also have no value beyond the
information they provide; revising them to entail an exchange or game with its own payo↵
would add an important new dimension. Here, we have chosen to interpret our key term Si as
a proxy for either social capital or social prominence. While this agnosticism emphasises the
wide applicability of our model, it also conflates two distinct concepts, which is not without
risk (cf. Power and Ready, 2018). By adding more specificity to the process and nature of
interactions, we may be able to establish the distinct e↵ects of social prominence versus social
capital on reputational formation and assessment.
Our model is also currently agnostic on exactly how social prominence/capital influences
the payo↵ of signalling. Further work should investigate the form that these costs and benefits
take. While costs are often assumed to be production costs directly entailed in the enactment
of the signal, this need not be the case. They may, instead, be social costs imposed by receivers
on “cheats” (Lachmann et al., 2001; Barker et al., 2019), exemplified by “badges of status” in
sparrows (Rohwer, 1975). One finding from the altered prior mechanism is that even failed
signals may be interpreted as indicating high quality if individuals have su ciently high social
prominence/capital. This implies that such individuals would not be seen as “cheats,” and
so would not face these socially imposed costs; instead, the burden of such costs would fall
most heavily on individuals with lower social prominence/capital, further exacerbating their
disadvantage (as the example of the two firewalkers also suggests). To explore this possibility,
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future work should explicitly explore the consequences of modelling the costs of signalling as
being receiver-dependent.
An important feature of our model is that everyone observes the public signalling events
(and learns aggregate information of everyone’s assessments with the revelation of Si). How-
ever, it is plausible that social network structure could impact who is able to observe whose
signals (Takács et al., 2021). Relatedly, we do not extensively explore how the relative weight
of private versus public information – and the extent to which these distinct information
sources agree or conflict with each other – may impact the updating process (Valone, 2007)
(though see SI Sections 2.2 and 2.3.1). It would be fruitful to model how widely information
is aggregated, how extensively acts are observed, and how receivers balance the varied and
potentially conflicting inputs they receive.
Finally, future modelling work should investigate the co-evolution of strategies with so-
cial structure, drawing on empirically-validated models of learning in strategic interactions
(Camerer et al., 2003). “Quality,” too, could be seen as malleable, if, for example, it is seen as
embodied or human capital itself (Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1988), and so may also co-evolve
with an individual’s social prominence/capital.
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1 Analytical model derivations
See Figure SI.1 for a schematic representation of the key elements for the altered prior and
altered payo↵ mechanisms.
1.1 Equilibria of the signalling games
We reiterate the elements of the game:
• Ingredients:
– N individuals each with quality qi 2 {0, 1}
– Common priors about qi, denoted ⇡1i. Note that in the altered prior mechanism,
Si a↵ects this prior.
– Social prominence/capital Si, set to 0 for the individual with lowest prominence/capital
and 1 for the highest.
– Action space a 2 {r,¬r} (to signal or not to signal).
– The outcome o 2 {s,¬s} of each signal is probabilistic: a signal succeeds (o = s)
with probability ✓1 for individuals with quality qi = 1 and with probability ✓0 for
individuals with quality qi = 0.
– Payo↵s are Pi(qi, q̂i, ai), where q̂i is the inference made about i’s quality at the
end of the game. The payo↵ function has the following properties: 1) ⇧(1, q̂i, r) 
⇧(1, q̂i,¬r) > ⇧(0, q̂i, r)   ⇧(0, q̂i,¬r), i.e. it is costlier to signal for type q = 0,
and 2) it is beneficial to be perceived to be of high quality, which is expressed as
d⇧(qi,q̂i,ai)
dq̂i
> 0. Note that the in altered payo↵ mechanism, Si also enters the payo↵
function, but the two properties above continue to hold.
• The game unfolds as follows:
– All players simultaneously decide on their signalling strategy P (r|qi, Si).
– For players with mixed strategies 0 < P (r|qi, Si) < 1, a move of nature decides ai,
i.e. whether they signal, according to probability P (r|qi, Si).
– For each player i who signals, a move of nature decides oi (whether her signal is
successful).
– All players observe ai and oi for all other players, and make the same inference
q̂i|ai, oi using Bayes’ formula.
– Payo↵s are realized.
The solution concept we use to solve this static costly signalling game is that of a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile (the combination of each type’s
strategy for a given value of S: (P (r|q = 1, S), P (r|q = 0, S)) in which neither player would
change strategy given the strategy of the other player. A Bayesian Nash equilibrium puts a
constraint on the beliefs that actors hold. Because we are in a game of incomplete information
(the types of other actors are unknown), actors hold probabilistic beliefs about the type of
other actors given the actions they observe. In a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, these beliefs are
consistent with the strategies of actors and they are updated by Bayes’ rule after observing
actors’ actions. An example of a violation in our system would be if an observer interpreted
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(a) (b)
Figure SI.1: Schematic of the analytical models. Individual i faces the choice to signal (r) or
not (¬r). Signalling entails a cost (c0 for q = 0 and c1 for q = 1, and succeeds with proba-
bility ✓0 for q = 0 individuals and ✓1 for q = 1 individuals). Si (social prominence/capital)
enters in either by being revealed during the public signalling event and influencing observers’
inferences about i’s quality q̂i (a, altered prior mechanism), or by e↵ectively altering the
cost c of signalling (b, altered payo↵ mechanism). [Image credits: pongsakornRed, Freepik,
Smashicons, Kiranshastry].
a signaller as being type 0 (low quality) even though the strategy of a type 0 actor is to never
signal.
Denote as (P ⇤0 , P
⇤
1 ) the strategy profiles (P (r|q = 1, S), P (r|q = 0, S)) which can be
equilibria. These can be:
• (0, 0): pooling equilibrium with no signal
• (0, 1): separating equilibrium where type 1 individuals signal and type 0 individuals do
not.
• (0 < P ⇤0 < 1, 1): hybrid equilibrium where type 0 signal with some probability and type
1 signal always. This is the case when type 0 is indi↵erent between signalling and not
signalling.
• (1, 1): pooling equilibrium where all signal.
Note that (0 < P ⇤0 < 1, 0) and (1, 0 < P
⇤
1 < 1) are trivially excluded because the cost of
signalling is higher for low quality individuals. (0 < P ⇤0 < 1, 0 < P
⇤
1 < 1) is excluded because
it is not possible for both type 1 and type 0 actors to be simultaneously indi↵erent between
r and ¬r. Finally, (0, 0 < P ⇤1 < 1) is also excluded because when such an equilibrium exists,
(0, 1) exists as well, so we focus on (0, 1) to simplify our analysis (none of our important
conclusions are a↵ected by this).
The strategy profile must be solved for every value of Si 2 [0, 1] since Si a↵ects the payo↵s
either directly (altered payo↵ mechanism) or via q̂i (altered prior mechanism). Hence, which
of the above strategy profiles can be an equilibrium will depend on Si. In what follows, we
outline the conditions that must be satisfied for each of the four types of strategy profiles to
constitute an equilibrium. These conditions hold independently of whether we are considering
the altered prior or altered payo↵ mechanism, so we include Si as an argument of the payo↵
function to capture both cases. In all the equations below, q̂ is the inferred quality given the
strategies P ⇤0 and P
⇤
1 , and given the outcome s and ¬s. The inferred quality follows Equations
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1, 2 and 3 (main text), except when the action is o↵-equilibrium. In these cases, we specify
below the belief formed given an o↵-equilibrium action.
The condition for a pooling equilibrium with no signal (0, 0) is:
⇧(1, q̂i, Si, r) < ⇧(1, q̂i, Si,¬r) ) ⇧(1, 1, Si, r) < ⇧(1, 0.5, Si,¬r) (SI.1)
In this equilibrium, signalling is o↵-equilibrium, so we assume that if a signal is made, ob-
servers infer that the signaller is type 1. Whereas if no one signals, q̂ = 0.5 for everyone. Note
too that whenever signalling is fully informative about type (such as in this o↵-equilibrium
signal), the outcome (s or ¬s) doesn’t matter and can be ignored.
Equation SI.1 says that for (0, 0) to be an equilibrium, type 1 must prefer not to signal and
have reputation ⇡1i = 0.5 in the eyes of the observers, than to signal and obtain a reputation
q̂ = 1 in the eyes of observers. When this inequality is satisfied, then it is automatically true
that type 0 individuals also do not signal (since their cost is higher, the equivalent inequality
for type 0 is automatically satisfied).
The conditions for a separating equilibrium (0, 1) are:
⇧(1, q̂, Si,¬r) < ⇧(1, q̂, Si, r) ) ⇧(1, 0, Si,¬r) < ⇧(1, 1, Si, r) (SI.2)
⇧(0, q̂, Si, r) < ⇧(0, q̂, Si,¬r) ) ⇧(0, 1, Si, r) < ⇧(0, 0, Si,¬r) (SI.3)
In this equilibrium, those who signal are inferred to be type 1 (q̂|r = 1). The outcome (s or
¬s) is irrelevant since the signal itself is fully informative in a separating equilibrium. Those
who do not signal are inferred to be type 0 (q̂|¬r = 0). Hence, (0, 1) is an equilibrium if it
is worth it for type 1 to signal and obtain reputation 1 and not worth it for type 0 to signal,
even though this means he/she will get reputation 0.
The conditions for a hybrid equilibrium are:
⇧(1, 0, Si,¬r) < E[⇧(1, q̂, Si, r)] (SI.4)
⇧(0, q̂, Si,¬r) = E[⇧(0, q̂, Si, r)] (SI.5)
In this equilibrium, the decision to participate in the public signal is not fully informative
(since 0 < P ⇤0 (Si) < 1, so the observer cannot be sure that an actor signalling is type 1 and an
actor not signalling is type 0). Hence the outcome (s or ¬s) of the signal is informative (as long
as ✓0 6= ✓1) and will a↵ect q̂. Since the outcome is stochastic, the actors must consider their
expected payo↵ from signalling, where the expectation is taken over the outcomes o 2 {s,¬s}.
In this equilibrium, type 0 is indi↵erent between signalling and not signalling. Specifically
there exists P ⇤0 (Si) such that condition SI.5 holds. When this condition holds, then type 1
individuals automatically prefer to signal, as expressed by inequality SI.4.
Finally, the condition for the pooling equilibrium where all signal (1, 1) is:
⇧(0, 0, Si,¬r) < E[⇧(0, q̂, Si, r)] (SI.6)
Type 0 must prefer to signal than not to signal and get reputation 0 (in this case, not signalling
is an o↵-equilibrium action; we assume that observers who do not signal when everyone else
does are inferred to be type 0). Again, in this equilibrium, outcomes are informative since
signalling is not, and so we take the expectation over outcomes o 2 {s,¬s}.
With these conditions, we can study which strategy profile can be an equilibrium at
di↵erent values of Si, and how P ⇤0 will depend on Si in the hybrid equilibrium. This will
depend on how Si a↵ects the payo↵s.
We now consider each mechanism in turn.
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1.2 Mechanism 1: altered prior
With the altered prior mechanism, Si serves as an indicator of quality, such that the prior is
⇡1i = f(Si) instead of ⇡1i = .5 (f 0(Si) > 0) for those who signal. Thus the equations for the
inference of quality are (modified from Equations 1,2 and 3):
q̂i(Si)|r, s =
✓1P (r|q = 1)f(Si)
✓1P (r|q = 1)f(Si) + ✓0P (r|q = 0)(1  f(Si))
(SI.7)
q̂i(Si)|r,¬s =
(1  ✓1)P (r|q = 1)f(Si)
(1  ✓1)P (r|q = 1)f(Si) + (1  ✓0)P (r|q = 0)(1  f(Si))
(SI.8)
q̂i|¬r =
(1  P (r|q = 1))
(1  P (r|q = 1)) + (1  P (r|q = 0)) (SI.9)
Here we assume that ⇧(1, 1, r) > 0 and ⇧(0, 1, r) > 0: a low quality individual prefers to be
perceived as high quality even if she incurs the cost of signalling. Thus we cannot have a
separating equilibrium. Hence, we either have a hybrid equilibrium with P ⇤0 < 1 or a pooling
equilibrium with P ⇤0 = P
⇤
1 = 1.
We first establish that in the hybrid equilibrium, P ⇤0 increases with Si. Let us suppose
that for some social prominence/capital level Si we have a hybrid equilibrium. Then we know
that there exists P ⇤0 such that:
E[⇧(0, q̂(Si), r)] = ⇧(0, q̂,¬r) (SI.10)
Equation SI.10 defines the equilibrium value P ⇤0 implicitly. We thus use implicit di↵eren-







The right hand side is equal to 0 because the payo↵ function does not directly include Si and



































The left hand side is positive because with the altered prior mechanism, social prominence/capital
acts as an indicator that informs the prior (f(Si)), boosting q̂. On the right hand side, q̂
decreases as P ⇤0 increases since the signal becomes less useful for identifying high quality in-
dividuals as more low quality individuals participate. Hence, for the equality to hold, dP ⇤0 dSi
must also be positive in the hybrid equilibrium. At some value of Si, P ⇤0 increases to 1 and
we get to the pooling equilibrium in which all signal.
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Having established that P ⇤0 increases with Si in the hybrid equilibrium, let us examine how
reputational gain changes with Si. Let us start with the hybrid equilibrium first. Equation
SI.11 shows that Dq̂
DSi
= 0 in the hybrid equilibrium. In contrast, for all Si values for which
pooling is the equilibrium, P ⇤0 and P
⇤







> 0. If Si
is unknown before the public event, then reputational gain is simply q̂(Si)   0.5. Indeed,
without any information, ⇡1i = 0.5 if we assume there are as many low quality as high quality
individuals. Thus reputational gain is null in the hybrid equilibrium and increasing with Si
in the pooling equilibrium.
Thus, to explain the pattern in Figure 1, the public signalling event must reveal unknown
information about social prominence or social capital. Indeed, if Si is already fully known
before the event, reputational gain is q̂(Si)  f(Si). This would clearly decrease as a function








  1) < 0
1.3 Mechanism 2: altered payo↵
Figure SI.2b qualitatively depicts the succession of equilibria under the altered payo↵ mech-
anism as the social prominence/capital of individuals increases. The following explains why
equilibria succeed each other in this way.
Si now a↵ects the payo↵ directly by increasing the extent to which the signaller’s repu-




> 0 (it is for
example satisfied if ⇧ = g(Si)q̂   ci).
Consider individuals with a specific social prominence/capital level Sn such that (0, 0) is
an equilibrium for these individuals and so inequality SI.1 holds. This happens if Sn is very
low and thus lowers the value of having a high reputation q̂i even for the high individual whose
cost of signalling is c1.
Now consider another individual with social prominence/capital level Sp > Sn. Since
prominence and reputation are complementary, at some value Sp large enough, the inequality
SI.1 no longer holds. At that point, ⇧(1, 0.5,¬r, Si) < ⇧(1, 1, r, Si). This satisfies the inequal-
ity SI.2, one of the conditions for the separating equilibrium. This separating equilibrium will
be stable for all Si   Sp as long as ⇧(0, 1, r, Si) < ⇧(0, 0,¬r, Si) (inequality SI.3).
Now consider Sq > Sp. Because of the complementarity between Si and q̂, inequality SI.2
remains true as Si increases. However, ⇧(0, 1, r, Si) increases with Si, while ⇧(0, 0,¬r, Si)
decreases (or stays constant) with Si. Hence, there is some Sq > Sp at which SI.3 no longer
holds and type 0 individuals will choose to signal with positive probability (P ⇤0 > 0).
We have just established that as Si increases, we move from a pooling equilibrium, to
a separating equilibrium, to a hybrid equilibrium (P (r|q = 0) > 0, 1). In hybrid equilibria,
individuals of type 0 signal with some probability P ⇤0 > 0, determined by condition SI.5.
We now show that the value of P ⇤0 which satisfies condition SI.5 increases with Si, as
shown in Figure SI.2b.
Condition SI.5 defines the equilibrium value of P ⇤0 implicitly, and so we use implicit dif-
ferentiation to determine how it varies with Si.




dE[⇧(0, q̂, Si, r)]
dSi
+
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dE[⇧(0, q̂, Si, r)]
dP ⇤0
q̂i in Equations 1 and 2 (main text) decreases with P (r|q = 0) (the inference about quality
from signalling is lowered if more low quality individuals participate), hence the denominator
is negative. Furthermore, because of the complementarity of Si and q̂, the numerator is also






We have established that P ⇤0 increases with Si. At some level Si, P
⇤
0 = 1, and we have the
pooling equilibrium in which all individuals signal and inequality SI.6 holds. Note, however,
that when all signal, signalling in and of itself loses its information content (since all types do
it), although the outcome from the signal is still informative (since ✓1 and ✓0 di↵er).
Nonetheless, as (1, 1) becomes a viable equilibrium at high Si, (0, 0) can simultaneously
be another viable equilibrium. Indeed, inequalities SI.1 and SI.6 can hold simultaneously.
Additional norms outside of the scope of this model would determine which of these two
equilibria prevails at a given Si.










< 0. This shows that the altered payo↵ mechanism cannot alone
account for the pattern that reputational gain often increases with Si (Figure 1).
1.4 Figures illustrating each mechanism and their combination
Figure SI.2a illustrates the strategies for the altered prior mechanism (equivalent to what is
shown in Figure 2 in the main text), Figure SI.2b illustrates the strategies for the altered
payo↵ mechanism alone, and Figure SI.2c illustrates the strategies for both the altered prior
and altered payo↵ mechanisms taken together. The parameters and functional form used here
are consistent with those used in Figure 2 in the main text: ✓1 = .8, ✓0 = .6, c1 = .2, c0 = .4.
The payo↵ function in the absence of the altered payo↵ mechanism is simply ⇧i = q̂i   ci.
The payo↵ function with the altered payo↵ mechanism is ⇧i = (S2i + 0.1)q̂i   ci. The prior
function f(Si) (for the altered prior mechanism) is f(Si) = 0.1+ .9Si (so that the priors range
between 0.1 and 0.9). These are also the parameters and functional forms used in Figures 3
and 4 and in fact in most figures of Section 2 unless otherwise specified.
We see the succession of the four equilibrium strategy regimes in the case of the altered
payo↵ mechanism, with a pooling equilibrium where no one signals at low values of Si. When
combining the altered prior and altered payo↵mechanisms, we see that the pooling equilibrium
where all individuals signal arises earlier. This is because the influence of Si on the prior
increases the benefits of signalling even for low quality individuals and shields them from
losing reputation in case of a failure.
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(a) Altered prior mechanism



















(b) Altered payo↵ mechanism



















(c) Altered prior and altered payo↵ mechanisms combined
Figure SI.2: Equilibrium strategies of the altered prior mechanism, the altered payo↵ mech-
anism, and the altered prior and altered payo↵ mechanisms in combination.
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2 Agent based model
See Figure SI.3 for a schematic representation of the key elements of the agent based model.
2.1 Model structure in detail
Initialisation
• Derive the strategies of the signalling interaction for each type of individual and each
level of social prominence/capital Si = 0, 0.01, 0.02, ..., 1. The parameters that govern
these strategies are the parameters governing the signalling act itself: ✓1, ✓0, (the prob-
abilities of signal success) c1, c0 (the costs of the signal), and the parameters governing
how Si a↵ects the payo↵ function and the prior perception of quality ⇡1i. In what
follows, ⇧i|r = (S2i + 0.1)q̂i   ci and ⇡1i = .1 + .8 ⇤ Si.
• Initialise N = 300 individuals. For each:
– draw at random its quality q = 0 or q = 1
– draw at random whether the individual enjoys an initial favourable bias in her
social prominence/capital (bias = 1 or bias = 0).
• Initialise the interaction weights wij,t=0 in the following way (wij,t captures the relative
propensity of j interacting with i (in the case of the pairwise interactions) or supporting
i (in the case of show of social support during the public event) at time t as specified in
detail below) :
– If i has bias = 1, randomly draw a vector of 299 weights wij,t=0 from {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10}
– If i has bias = 0, randomly draw a vector of 299 weights wij,t=0 from {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}
We thus obtain a weighted adjacency matrix in which some individuals have a slight
initial advantage in the number of weights they get from other individuals. Introducing
this initial bias allows us to study the role of quality versus social prominence/capital
in the reputational and social trajectories of each agent.
Dynamic process:
1. Pairwise interactions: at each time step t,
• For each individual j, we draw M individuals whom she will visit in this time step.
The draws are done according to a multinomial distribution with probability vector
given by wij,tP
j 6=i wij,t
• Each visit by j to each i among the M people drawn above allows j to learn about
i’s quality with some noise. More precisely, during her visit, j experiences the
quality of the interaction with i (e.g., a more cooperative attitude on the part of
i). The quality of the experience j has when interacting with i is a random variable
Vt ⇠ N(qi, ). This random variable is thus a noisy observation of i’s quality. This





• After each visit, the weight wij is updated to reflect the inference: wij,t+1 =  wij,t+
q̂B
i,t
, where   is a discount factor to capture memory, or present bias.
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(a) (b)
Figure SI.3: Schematic of the agent based models, showing the pairwise interactions (a) and
subsequent public signalling event (b). [Image credits: pongsakornRed, Freepik, Smashicons,
Kiranshastry].
2. Public event: at the end of each time step t, after the pairwise interactions, there is a
public event unfolding as follows:
• Compute Si, each individual’s level of social prominence/capital: Each individual
i may enjoy a certain level of social prominence/capital Si (e.g., through signs of
deference or accolades). This is determined by the sum of the interaction weights
going to i: Wi =
P
j 6=iwij . Social prominence/capital Si is then the normalisation
of Wi between 0 and 1 according to Si =
Wi min(W)
max(W) min(W) (where W is simply the
vector of all Wi).
• Cue only scenario: there is no opportunity for costly signalling, just an aggregation
of information about social prominence/capital. In this scenario, everyone observes
Si for each individual. They use Si as an indicator of the quality of i: ⇡1i =
.1 + .8 ⇤ Si. The weights are again updated wij,t+1 =  wij,t + ⇡1i
• costly signalling scenario: individuals can engage in costly signalling. Each indi-
vidual determines whether to signal or not according to their Si and quality, based
on the Nash equilibrium strategies P (r|qi, Si). If we are in a hybrid equilibrium
with low quality individuals using a mixing strategy 0 < P (r|qi, Si) < 1, then their
decision is a random draw according to that probability. Then, for those who sig-
nal, the success or failure of their signal is drawn at random using the probabilities
✓1 and ✓0, according to their respective qualities.
• Inferences q̂i are drawn according to Equations 1, 2 and 3 (main text), and weights
are again updated to wij,t+1 =  wij,t + q̂i.
2.2 Outcomes under alternative combinations of mechanisms
The agent based model combines in a modular way multiple mechanisms by which individuals
attempt to learn about each others’ quality (private learning through pairwise interactions,
social cues, signalling with the altered prior mechanism, and signalling with the altered payo↵
mechanism). The di↵erent possible combinations are:
1. Private learning (through pairwise interactions) only
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2. Social prominence/capital as a cue only (no private learning)
3. Private learning, and a signalling event where social prominence/capital plays no role.
Here we consider parameters that lead to a pooling equilibrium (where both types
signal, but still with di↵erent probability of success) and parameters that lead to a
hybrid equilibrium (where the low quality individual signals with some probability).
4. Signalling with the altered prior mechanism only without private learning
5. Signalling with the altered payo↵ mechanism only without private learning
6. Signalling with the altered prior and altered payo↵ mechanisms combined without pri-
vate learning
7. Private learning and social prominence/capital as a cue (in the main text)
8. Private learning and signalling with the altered prior mechanism (in the main text)
9. Private learning and signalling with the altered payo↵ mechanism (in the main text)
10. Private learning and signalling with the altered prior and altered payo↵ mechanisms
combined (in the main text)
In the main text, we present the last 4 scenarios. To provide baselines, we show the outcomes
for the first 6 scenarios here in Figure SI.4.
Private learning causes a slow learning about true quality, reflected in the trajectories
of Si. This leads to a distribution of social prominence/capital that reflects true quality
(although high quality individuals with low initial prominence/capital maintain a long-term
disadvantage as they on average receive fewer pairwise interactions to prove their worth).
Private learning with signalling (but no e↵ect of social prominence/capital) can accelerate
the learning about quality if the strategies are hybrid equilibrium or fully separating (third
scenario represented in Figure ??. If the parameters are such that the signalling equilibrium is
a pooling equilibrium in which everyone signals, then learning happens through the pairwise
interactions and observations about the success and failure of the signals. We see that the
initial social prominence/capital of an individual plays no lingering role in this scenario and
that low quality individuals are able to maintain high social prominence/capital, albeit lower
than in the case of the hybrid equilibrium.
In contrast, in the model that features only the cue of social prominence/capital (without
private learning), we have the opposite outcome. No one learns about quality (reflected by
the fact that the trajectories do not show any temporal trend) and the distribution of social
prominence/capital reflects initial di↵erences in social prominence/capital.
Signalling with the altered prior mechanism in the absence of private learning still allows
for some learning. Yet this is less complete than in Figure 3 and 4 of the main text. Indeed, low
quality and high initial social prominence/capital individuals are in the “pooling equilibrium”
in which everyone signals (the threshold between hybrid and pooling is around Si = 0.4).
Learning only occurs because of the di↵erence in the frequency of signal success between high
and low quality individuals.
Signalling with the altered payo↵ mechanism in the absence of private learning leads to
similar patterns as with private learning: the signalling equilibrium separates types, except
for those stuck in the reputational poverty trap.
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Mech 1 & 2 (no private learning)
Cue only (no private learning) Mech 1: Alt Prior (no private learning) Mech 2: Alt Payoff (no private learning)
Private learning only Signal, no soc prom/cap (pooling eq) Signal, no soc prom/cap (hybrid eq)
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type q=0, init S_i=high q=0, init S_i=low q=1, init S_i=high q=1, init S_i=low
(a) Representative individual time series of Si, for individuals of di↵erent quality and initial social
prominence/capital.
Mech 1 & 2 (no private learning)
Cue only (no private learning) Mech 1: Alt Prior (no private learning) Mech 2: Alt Payoff (no private learning)
Private learning only Signal, no soc prom/cap (pooling eq) Signal, no soc prom/cap (hybrid eq)
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00




















type q=0, init S_i=high q=0, init S_i=low q=1, init S_i=high q=1, init S_i=low
(b) The distribution of Si in each scenario, as a function of the individual’s quality and initial social
prominence/capital.
Figure SI.4: Agent based model results, for alternative scenarios
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Signalling with both the altered prior and altered payo↵ mechanisms in combination in the
absence of private learning further contributes to the “reputational shield.” This is because
the high social prominence/capital low-quality individuals do not get revealed during pairwise
interactions.
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In the main text, we indicated that the altered payo↵ mechanism increases the inequality
in social prominence/capital via a feedback happening through pairwise interactions. This is
illustrated in Figure SI.5. It shows that high quality individuals who start with high social
prominence/capital accrue more pairwise interactions than they do in the other scenarios.
This is due to the fact that other high quality individuals are stuck in a reputational poverty
trap, so they get very low numbers of interactions, which accrue instead to high social promi-
nence/capital individuals. This leads to substantial inequality in the number of interactions
that individuals have.
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(c) Mechanism 2: Altered Payoff (d) Mechanisms 1 & 2
(a) Cue Only (b) Mechanism 1: Altered Prior
























type q=0, init S_i=high q=0, init S_i=low q=1, init S_i=high q=1, init S_i=low
(a) Representative individual time series of the count of pairwise interactions, for individuals of di↵erent
quality and initial social prominence/capital.
(c) Mechanism 2: Altered Payoff (d) Mechanisms 1 & 2
(a) Cue Only (b) Mechanism 1: Altered Prior















type q=0, init S_i=high q=0, init S_i=low q=1, init S_i=high q=1, init S_i=low
(b) The distribution of the number of pairwise interactions in each model, as a function of the indi-
vidual’s quality and initial social prominence/capital.
Figure SI.5: Distribution and changes in the number of pairwise interactions for the scenarios
in Figures 3 & 4 of the main text.
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2.3 Robustness of results
Here we investigate how our conclusions change as we modify some aspects of the model.
2.3.1 Mutual learning in the pairwise interactions
The private learning during the pairwise interaction is one-sided in the main model: if i
initiates an interaction with j, then only i learns about the quality of j (we can think of i
making a request to j and learning how cooperative or resourceful j is). Now, instead, we
can assume that both individuals can learn about each other. Figure SI.6 below shows the
outcome of this alternative modelling assumption. Here, we allow both i and j to learn about
each other when i initiates an interaction with j (through the same inference procedure as
described above).
We see that this assumption does not change the fundamental dynamics. The main
di↵erence is that private learning plays a slightly more important role with this alternative.
In the cue only model, there is a little bit faster learning about the real quality of individuals
whose initial social prominence/capital hides their real quality. Similarly, the “fall from grace”
is faster for low quality/high initial social prominence/capital individuals in scenarios that
include the altered payo↵ mechanism. And, when the altered payo↵ mechanism is in play,
more high quality/low initial social prominence/capital individuals fall into the reputational
poverty trap. While the mutually informative pairwise interactions means there is slightly
more movement in Si for low quality individuals (and high quality individuals caught in the
trap), it is still slight and insu cient for them to break out.
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(c) Mechanism 2: Altered Payoff (d) Mechanisms 1 & 2
(a) Cue Only (b) Mechanism 1: Altered Prior

























type q=0, init S_i=high q=0, init S_i=low q=1, init S_i=high q=1, init S_i=low
(a) Representative individual time series of Si, for individuals of di↵erent quality and initial social
prominence/capital.
(c) Mechanism 2: Altered Payoff (d) Mechanisms 1 & 2
(a) Cue Only (b) Mechanism 1: Altered Prior















type q=0, init S_i=high q=0, init S_i=low q=1, init S_i=high q=1, init S_i=low
(b) The distribution of Si in each model, as a function of the individual’s quality and initial social
prominence/capital.
Figure SI.6: Agent based model results when the pairwise interactions allow both parties to
learn about each other, for the same set of scenarios as in Figures 3 & 4 of the main text.
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2.3.2 E↵ect of memory
When memory is perfect, initial impressions linger and so generally slow down the process of
revelation. The lingering e↵ect of low initial social prominence/capital is seen most clearly
with the altered prior mechanism, with those individuals with low quality and high initial
social prominence/capital retaining their high social prominence/capital over time, and in-
dividuals with high quality/low initial social prominence/capital increasing their prominence
very gradually relative to the case where   < 1.
When the altered payo↵ mechanism operates, perfect memory generally slows the “fall
from grace” for low quality/high initial social prominence/capital individuals. Most notably,
when the two mechanisms work in tandem, these individuals can end up with almost any
possible value of Si: while some bottom out, others are able to maintain the reputational
shield.
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(c) Mechanism 2: Altered Payoff (d) Mechanisms 1 & 2
(a) Cue Only (b) Mechanism 1: Altered Prior

























type q=0, init S_i=high q=0, init S_i=low q=1, init S_i=high q=1, init S_i=low
(a) Representative individual time series of Si, for individuals of di↵erent quality and initial social
prominence/capital.
(c) Mechanism 2: Altered Payoff (d) Mechanisms 1 & 2
(a) Cue Only (b) Mechanism 1: Altered Prior













type q=0, init S_i=high q=0, init S_i=low q=1, init S_i=high q=1, init S_i=low
(b) The distribution of Si in each model, as a function of the individual’s quality and initial social
prominence/capital.
Figure SI.7: Agent based model results, with perfect memory, for the same set of scenarios
as in Figures 3 & 4 of the main text.
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2.3.3 Success and failure unrelated to quality
Here we present the results of model runs where the probability of success and failure is
unrelated to quality. When this is the case, the quality of individuals whose Si is high enough
to induce them to play pooling equilibrium strategies is no longer distinguishable by observers.
The consequence is that the “reputational shield” is very robust (unless we increase greatly
the number of bilateral interactions and reduce the noise in the learning during those bilateral
interactions). As we see under the altered prior mechanism, individuals who have an Si high
enough to play pooling equilibrium strategies seem to converge towards a similar distribution
of Si independent of quality.
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(a) Mechanism 1: Altered Prior (b) Mechanism 2: Altered Payoff (c) Mechanisms 1 & 2




















type q=0, init S_i=high q=0, init S_i=low q=1, init S_i=high q=1, init S_i=low
(a) Representative individual time series of Si, for individuals of di↵erent quality and initial social
prominence/capital.
(a) Mechanism 1: Altered Prior (b) Mechanism 2: Altered Payoff (c) Mechanisms 1 & 2
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(b) The distribution of Si in each model, as a function of the individual’s quality and initial social
prominence/capital.
Figure SI.8: Agent based model results, when success and failure are not related to quality
✓H = ✓L, , for the same set of scenarios as in Figures 3 & 4 of the main text.
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3 Statement on Citation Diversity
Recent work in several fields of science has identified a bias in citation practices such that
papers from women and other minority scholars are under-cited relative to the number of
such papers in the field (Mitchell et al., 2013; Dion et al., 2018; Caplar et al., 2017; Maliniak
et al., 2013; Dworkin et al., 2020). Here we sought to proactively consider choosing references
that reflect the diversity of the field in thought, form of contribution, gender, race, ethnicity,
and other factors. First, we obtained the predicted gender of the first and last author of
each reference by using databases that store the probability of a first name being carried by
a woman (Dworkin et al., 2020; Zhou et al., 2020). By this measure (and excluding self-
citations to the first and last authors of our current paper), our references contain 13.59%
woman(first)/woman(last), 12.94% man/woman, 3.95% woman/man, and 69.52% man/man.
This method is limited in that a) names, pronouns, and social media profiles used to construct
the databases may not, in every case, be indicative of gender identity and b) it cannot account
for intersex, non-binary, or transgender people. Second, we obtained predicted racial/ethnic
category of the first and last author of each reference by databases that store the probability
of a first and last name being carried by an author of color (Ambekar et al., 2009; Sood and
Laohaprapanon, 2018). By this measure (and excluding self-citations), our references contain
7.94% author of color (first)/author of color (last), 14.21% white author/author of color,
15.04% author of color/white author, and 62.8% white author/white author. This method is
limited in that a) names and Florida Voter Data to make the predictions may not be indicative
of racial/ethnic identity, and b) it cannot account for Indigenous and mixed-race authors, or
those who may face di↵erential biases due to the ambiguous racialization or ethnicization of
their names. We look forward to future work that could help us to better understand how to
support equitable practices in science.
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